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Introduction
As in many other regions in the world, agriculture has been the most protected and
distorted sector in the Asian and Pacific region.  Many countries in the region are currently
following a combined approach to agricultural trade reform.  Those countries have been
making some progress towards multilateral trade liberalization through the World Trade
Organization (WTO) trade negotiations and regional trade liberalization through regional
trade agreements (RTAs).  As surveyed in chapters II and III, they have also been successful
in concluding a large number of bilateral trade agreements (BTAs).  Following the global
trend, regional integration is gaining momentum in the Asia-Pacific region.  Countries in
Asia and the Pacific have also taken the initiative in forming a mega-RTA similar to the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) or the European Union in recent years
(Scollay and Gilbert, 2001).  As Chandra and Pratap (2005) noted, “the emerging dinosauric
aspirations within the Asian region have also been discussed”.  They cited the “Expert
Group Meeting on the Regional Agreements in Asia and the Pacific” held in Bangkok in
January 2003 under the auspices of ESCAP as well as the International Conference on
“Building New Asia:  Towards an Asian Economic Community” held in New Delhi in March
2003 under the auspices of the Research and Information System for Non-Aligned Countries
(RIS), as examples of this trend.
The  ideas  of  regional  cooperation  among  the Association  of  South  East Asian
Nations plus China, Japan and the Republic of Korea (ASEAN plus 3) and ASEAN plus
SARRC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation) were highlighted at the ESCAP
meeting.  Chapters II and III of this book have provided detailed discussions on agricultural
trade liberalization in the South-East Asian and South Asian regions separately.  The main
objective of this chapter is to attempt to evaluate the impact of agricultural trade reform in
the Asia-Pacific region, focusing on RTAs and BTAs using some examples such as ASEAN,
SAARC, ASEAN plus 3, ASEAN plus 3 plus India, and the Indo-Lanka Free Trade Agreement
(FTA).
* The authors wish to thank the reviewers of the first draft of this chapter and Dr. Mia Mikic (Trade
and Investment Division, ESCAP) for their helpful comments.132
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows.  Section A briefly summarizes
the gains from the Doha agricultural trade reform with the focus on the Asia-Pacific region,
using recent quantitative assessments.  Section B briefly surveys the most popular technique,
i.e., computable general equilibrium (CGE) modelling, used in evaluating the effects of
RTAs.  The global CGE model and the database used in this study are briefly outlined in
section C.  The effects of selected RTAs and BTAs are evaluated in section D.  Limitations
of the modelling technique used in this chapter are considered in section E while section F
comprises concluding remarks and policy implications.
A.  Effects of the Doha agricultural reform – a brief overview
As surveyed in another paper that is part of this study (Bandara, 2007), a number
of studies have emerged on quantifying the possible effects of multilateral trade liberalization
in  agriculture  on  different  regions  in  the  world  under  the  Doha  Development  Agenda
(DDA).  It is not intended to reproduce similar empirical studies in this chapter.  Therefore,
the results of previous studies are used to highlight the implications of multilateral trade
liberalization for countries in the Asian and Pacific region.  Table 1 provides a summary of
the results of four main studies.  Column one of the table shows the results of one policy
simulation of the well-known World Bank study (Anderson and Martin, 2005a-2005g; Anderson
and others, 2005).  These results are relevant to agricultural trade liberalization (i.e., the
welfare effects of tiered agricultural tariff cuts, elimination of export subsidies and cuts in
actual domestic support, as of 2001, of 28 per cent in the United States, 18 per cent in the
European Union and 16 per cent in Norway).
The most striking feature of these results is that countries in the Asia-Pacific region
are  the  main  winners  of  Doha  agricultural  trade  liberalization.    While  the  total  global
welfare gain from this policy scenario is some US$ 74.5 billion (2015), the total gain for the
Asia-Pacific region is some US$ 32.6 billion (about 44 per cent of the total global gain).
However, the big winners in the region are developed countries such as Australia, Japan,
the Republic of Korea, Taiwan Province of China, New Zealand and Thailand.  Only China
as well as Hong Kong, China, Singapore and Viet Nam record small losses.  Although
many developing countries in South Asia and South-East Asia gain from agricultural trade
liberalization, the gains are just moderate.
Hertel and Keeney (2005) also examined the effects of agricultural trade policy
reforms under DDA, using their recently developed GTAP-AGR model.  The results of that
study are summarized in the second column of table 1.  The results of Hertel and Keeney
(2005)  also  indicate  that  agricultural  trade  reforms  under  DDA  generate  a  substantial
amount of global welfare (US$ 55.7 billion in 2001 value).  Developing countries would
gain  around  US$  11.9  billion.    Similar  to  the  previous  study,  import  market  access  for
agricultural  products  has  been  the  main  source  of  welfare  gains  (93  per  cent  of  total
gains).  The relative contribution of the abolition of export subsidies and domestic support
has  been  minimal.    According  to  the  study,  small  countries  such  as  Bangladesh,  the
Philippines and Viet Nam would lose while large countries such as China and India would
gain from full agricultural trade liberalization under DDA.133
Recently, Antimiani and others (2005) examined the effects of agricultural trade
liberalization  under  alternative  scenarios  by  incorporating  the  outcomes  of  interaction
between the strategies of country groups in the negotiations.  The main results of that
examination are summarised in column three of table 1, with the focus on countries in the
Asia-Pacific region.  The gains from agricultural trade liberalization in the study are similar
to those shown in the World Bank study.  According to the Antimiani study, the total global
welfare gain is some US$ 69.2 billion (2013) and the total Asia-Pacific gain is some US$
31.6  billion  (about  46  per  cent).    Once  again,  Japan,  the  Republic  of  Korea,  Taiwan
Province of China and Thailand are the biggest winners in the region while countries such
as Bangladesh, China, Indonesia and Viet Nam would lose marginally from agricultural
trade liberalization.
The above three studies are highly optimistic about agricultural trade liberalization.
The last column of table 1 summarizes the results of another recent study carried out by
a group of researchers who are also the main contributors in compiling of protection data
systematically and the development of the MAcMap database (Bouet and others, 2004a
and  2005).    The  researchers  claimed  that  most  of  the  global  CGE  studies  on  Doha
agricultural trade liberalization were excessively optimistic due to several reasons (Bouet
and others, 2004a).  Their welfare results are shown in percentage change form rather
than in absolute United States dollar terms compared with the other three studies.  The
welfare results of this study indicated that agricultural trade liberalization under DDA would
lead to a very small percentage increase in global welfare (0.08 per cent).  It is not clear
how they calculated this change and it is therefore very difficult to compare the results with
those of previous studies since they are in United States dollar terms.  The results across
countries and regions indicate that developing countries in the Asia-Pacific region would
gain again from agricultural trade liberalization.  However, agricultural trade liberalization
results in welfare losses in country groups such as sub-Saharan Africa, the Mediterranean
and the poorest countries of the world.  In general, in contrast to many other CGE studies,
this study suggests that the welfare gains from agricultural liberalization are just moderate.
All in all, the above quantitative assessments indicate that most countries in the
Asia-Pacific region may experience welfare gains as a result of agricultural trade reform
under DDA.  However, some developing countries such as Bangladesh and Viet Nam may
experience modest welfare losses and they are at risk.  Section C of this chapter examines
whether the countries in the region would gain further in undertaking agricultural trade
reform within RTAs and BTAs on top of multilateral agricultural trade liberalization.134











(US$ billion) (US$ billion) (% change)
Asia-Pacific
Australia and New Zealand 2.0 n.a. 2.0 n.a.
Singapore and Hong Kong, -0.1 n.a. n.a. 0.05
China
Japan 18.9 n.a. 23.5 0.05
Republic of Korea and 10.9 n.a. 3.1 n.a.
   Taiwan Province of China
Bangladesh 0.0 -0.050 -0.1 n.a.
China -0.5 0.560 -1.4 0.15
India 0.2 1.275 1.8 n.a.
Indonesia 0.1 0.085 -0.2 n.a.
Malaysia n.a. n.a. 1.3 n.a.
Philippines n.a. -0.085 -0.1 n.a.
Sri Lanka n.a. n.a. 0.2 n.a.
Thailand 0.9 n.a. 1.0 n.a.
Viet Nam -0.1 -0.007 -0.2 n.a.
Rest of South Asia 0.2 n.a. 0.7 n.a.
Rest of East Asia 0.1 n.a. n.a. n.a.
High-income countries 65.6 41.6 n.a. n.a.
European Union 25 plus EFTA 29.5 n.a. 8.8 0.14 and
0.11
United States of America 3.0 n.a. 3.0 0.05
Canada 1.4 n.a. 1.1 n.a.
Developing countries 9.0 11.9 n.a. n.a.
East Asia and the Pacific 0.5 n.a. n.a. n.a.
South Asia 0.4 n.a. n.a. 0.17
Europe and Central Asia 0.1 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Middle East and North Africa -0.8 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.3 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Latin America and Caribbean 8.1 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Transition economies n.a. 2.2
World total 74.5 55.7 69.2 0.08135
B.  Use of CGE models in evaluating RTAs
With  the  surge  of  RTAs  around  the  world  in  recent  years,  a  growing  body  of
literature has been developed that focuses on the empirical assessment of the effects of
those RTAs due to the increasing demand for such assessments.  The ambiguity of the
welfare effects of RTAs at theoretical level has also been a main reason for such increase
in  the  demand  for  empirical  assessments  (Harrison  and  others,  2003;  Robinson  and
Thierfelder, 2002).  Some of the quantitative assessments have been carried out by policy
analysts at the request of governments participating in RTAs (see, for example, Harrison
and others, 2003).  All these empirical studies can be classified by using two approaches.
The first approach is to categorize them based on the time perspective they adopt:  ex
ante or ex post (DeRosa, 1998).  While the ex ante evaluation estimate likely effects an
RTA prior to its implementation or predicts future outcomes of an existing RTA, the ex post
evaluation estimates such effects after the implementation of an RTA.  Adams and others
(2003) also followed this approach in reviewing empirical studies of RTAs.  The second
approach is to categorize them based on the methodology used in the studies, such as
analytical, residual imputation and survey methods.  Analytical studies involve using analytical
models or methods for both ex ante and ex post evaluations while residual imputation can
be employed only in the case of ex post situations.  Survey methods depend on surveying
various actors, sectors or industries in the economy.  Of the three, analytical models have
proven to be most popular among policy analysts.
A number of analytical techniques have been used by different analysts in recent
years to evaluate the effects of various RTAs around the world.  They range from single
equation regressions to large-scale, multi-country global CGE models such as the currently
popular GTAP model.  Baldwin and Venables (1995) classified all analytical models under
two groups:  econometric models and CGE models.  While econometric evaluations typically
involve a large amount of historical or contemporary data, the estimation of parameters
and hypothesis testing is done without a proper theoretical structure.  Adams and others
(2003) categorized the econometric evaluations (almost all of which are gravity models) as
ex post evaluations, and CGE applications as ex ante evaluations.  CGE applications are
conducted  based  on  a  clear  economy-wide  theoretical  structure,  but  rely  mainly  on
estimates of key parameters outside the model (Baldwin and Venables, 1995; DeRosa,
1998).  Both types of techniques have strengths and weaknesses (see Adams and others,
2003 and Neilsen, 2003 for detailed reviews).
Srinivasan and others (1993) surveyed several econometric studies from the 1960s
and 1970s that attempted to evaluate the degree of trade diversion or trade creation as
a result of the formation of RTAs in Europe and Latin America.  However, none of those
studies was able to present the welfare effects of RTAs because they lacked a proper
microeconomic foundation.  CGE models with a strong microeconomic foundation offer
a systematic way of analysing welfare changes.  Baldwin and Venables (1995) provided
a  systematic  approach  to  welfare  decomposition  by  grouping  a  number  of  possible
mechanisms for welfare changes into seven components, as detailed below:136
(a) In a setting of competitive world markets, an RTA may affect welfare through:
(i) Trade volumes, and hence changes in tariff revenue or quota rents;
(ii) Trade costs, and hence changes in import/export margins;
(iii) The terms of trade, through the large-country effects;
(b) In a setting of imperfectly competitive markets, an RTA may affect welfare
through:
(i) Output effects, and hence changes in producer rents;
(ii) Scale effects, and hence changes in production costs;
(iii) Variety effects where consumers value diversity itself;
(c) In the long term, an RTA may affect welfare through accumulation effects that
arise from changes in the rate of investment in those cases where the social
rate of return diverges from the social discount rate.
In  many  recent  CGE  studies  of  RTAs,  group  (a)  above  has  been  taken  into
consideration, particularly after the introduction of the welfare decomposition method by
Huff and Hertel (1996) into the GTAP framework.  This has been one of the main strengths
of  using  CGE  models  in  analysing  the  effects  of  RTAs.   There  are  CGE  models  that
include the extensions of GTAP capable of capturing the welfare effects of groups (b) and
(c) above.  In addition to the ability of global CGE models to capture economy-wide as well
as multiregional effects of RTAs, these models provide consistent and rigorously specified
theoretical frameworks for performing a range of policy simulations.  For this reason as
well as other strengths, CGE modelling is currently the most popular technique in assessing
RTAs.
As  noted  above,  the  increasing  demand  for  quantitative  assessments  of  PTAs
such as the European Union, NAFTA and the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) has given
rise to the extensive use of global modelling by policy analysts.  Multiregional, multisector
CGE models have been used as a tool for better understanding of the effects of an RTA.
The trade literature show many CGE modelling applications deal with issues related to
RTAs.  These applications were surveyed by Flam (1992), Baldwin and Venables (1995),
Francois and Sheills (1994), De Rosa (1998), and Robinson and Thierfelder (2002).  Despite
the  criticism  levelled  at  CGE  evaluations  of  PTAs  (Panagariya,  2000;  Panagariya  and
Dattagupta, 1999), however, Baldwin and Venables (1995), De Rosa (1998), Robinson
and Thierfelder (2002), Adams and others (2003) and Nielsen (2003) clearly recognized
the contributions made by CGE models in evaluating PTAs.  More recently, Harrison and
others (2003) summarized the conclusions of many CGE studies they had undertaken to
evaluate the effects of different RTAs, usually at the request of the client governments of
the World Bank.
The evaluation of RTAs in the Asia-Pacific region by using CGE models has also
been popular over the past decade or so.  Many CGE studies have focusing on single
RTAs as well as a number of RTAs and BTAs in the region.  Some of the early CGE137
studies of RTAs in the Asia-Pacific region were carried out by Lewis and others (1995),
Brown and others (1996), and Ballard and Cheong (1997).  Those studies examined the
effects of possible RTA initiatives in the region.  Following those early studies, there has
been  a  surge  of  CGE  studies  of  RTAs  in  recent  years  (for  example,  Robinson  and
Thierfelder, 2002, Nielsen, 2003, and Adams and others, 2003).  Of all these studies, it is
worth mentioning at least three studies that focused on a number of RTA initiatives similar
to the ones considered in chapter III.  The three studies are Ballard and Cheong (1997),
Scollay and Gilbert (2001) and Ma and Wang (2002).
1.  Ballard and Cheong, 1997
This  study  used  perfectly  competitive  and  imperfectly  competitive  versions  of
a  global  CGE  model  based  on  a  GTAP  database.    It  focused  on  the  following  policy
scenarios under different combinations of model assumptions:
(a) The regional initiative of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC);
(b) A Pacific FTA with 11 member nations;
(c) An East-Asia FTA;
(d) Global liberalization.
Three main conclusions of this study were:
(a) “Every member of a proposed new free trade area would reap welfare gains”;
(b) “The  imperfectly-competitive  model  simulates  substantially  larger  welfare
gains than does the perfectly-competitive model”;
(c) “Welfare gains will be larger when the proposed FTA is larger”.
2.  Scollay and Gilbert, 2001
This is the most comprehensive CGE study of RTAs and BTAs in the Asia-Pacific
region in terms of coverage.  It used the standard GTAP model and database, and focused
on a large number of RTAs and BTAs under four different headings:
(a) New bilateral and plurilateral subregional trade agreements (SRTAs) such as
the trans-Pacific initiatives and intra-Western Pacific initiatives;
(b) Potential steps towards the formation of an East Asian trade bloc;
(c) APEC liberalization on a nondiscriminatory basis and preferential basis;
(d) The formation of the Asia-Pacific trade bloc and global contexts.
The main conclusions of this comprehensive study were:
(a) The effects of many proposed and new small RTAs and BTAs (known as
SRTAs) were likely to be small;138
(b) The recent proliferation of bilateral and plurilateral SRTAs could create trade
conflicts and tension in the region;
(c) The welfare gains would be large in the case of SRTAs involving countries
such as Japan and the United States.
3.  Ma and Wang (2002)
This study used a recursive dynamic global CGE model and the GTAP database.
It covered the four FTA scenarios in the region:
(a) ASEAN plus China;
(b) ASEAN plus Japan;
(c) ASEAN plus 3 (Japan, China and the Republic of Korea);
(d) ASEAN plus China, Japan, the Republic of Korea and the United States.
The main conclusions of the study were:
(a) ASEAN plus China is the main winner among the four scenarios;
(b) Japan gains from the ASEAN plus Japan FTA at the expense of China;
(c) All countries gain from the ASEAN plus three FTA and it offers substantially
larger markets for its members.
While CGE models have been widely used to evaluate the effects of RTAs in the
Asia-Pacific  region,  in  general,  less  attention  has  been  paid  to  RTAs  in  South  Asia.
However, a number of GTAP-based CGE studies have focused on South Asian RTAs (see
Bandara, 2004 for a survey).  For example, Pigato and others (1997) briefly assessed the
effects  of  the  South  Asia  Preferential  Trading  Arrangement  (SAPTA)  using  the  GTAP
model; this can be considered as the first CGE study on SAPTA.  This study found that
SAPTA would create some welfare gains for its member countries, and that small countries
would benefit more.  However, unilateral trade liberalization would create larger gains for
the region, and India would benefit from unilateral trade liberalization to a greater extent
than the rest of South Asia.
Following the above study, Siriwardana (2001) used the GTAP model to investigate
several trade liberalization options for Sri Lanka beyond preferential trade liberalization
within SAARC.  The study conducted a series of 12 policy experiments with the GTAP
model, ranging from bilateral trade liberalization between Sri Lanka, other SAARC countries,
ASEAN  countries  and  other Asian  countries.    The  results  of  this  study  indicated  that
bilateral  trade  liberalization  with  other  SAARC  countries  would  be  beneficial  to  the  Sri
Lankan economy.
One of the most recent studies using GTAP to evaluate gains from a South Asian
Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA) is that of Bandara and Yu (2003).  This study investigated
the question of “how desirable is the South Asian Free Trade Area?”  To address this139
question,  a  series  of  policy  experiments  were  carried  out  with  the  GTAP  model.   Two
opposite policy simulations were performed:  (a) a unilateral trade liberalization scenario
(South Asian countries liberalizing trade unilaterally); and (b) a preferential trade liberalization
scenario (trade liberalization among trading partners in the region).  The results of the two
policy simulations demonstrated that the impact of preferential trade liberalization would
be very small and that the impact of unilateral trade liberalization was significant for South
Asia.  Under preferential liberalization, small countries would lose or gain marginally while
the biggest country in the region, India, would likely be the sole significant winner.
The  results  of  other  extra  policy  simulations  (preferential  trade  liberalization
between South Asia and ASEAN, the European Union and NAFTA) were also analysed in
this  study.    While  preferential  trade  between  South Asia  and ASEAN  was  expected  to
create adverse effects on South Asia, preferential trade between South Asia and European
Union or NAFTA was expected to be beneficial to South Asia.  More recently, Chandha
and Pratap (2005) used a global CGE model based on the GTAP database to investigate
a series of RTA scenarios involving South Asia.
The brief survey above indicates that a large number of attempts have been made
to evaluate the effects of RTAs in the Asia-Pacific region in recent years.  Many of these
studies have attempted to evaluate the overall effects of different RTAs.  Less attention
has  been  paid  to  the  agricultural  trade  liberalization  under  RTAs  in  this  region.    The
purpose of this chapter is to undertake a similar quantitative study, but with the focus on
agricultural  trade  liberalization.    Similar  to  many  previous  studies,  the  standard  GTAP
model and its latest database (version 6) have been used for this purpose.  Section C
provides a brief description of the GTAP model and database used in this chapter.
C.  GTAP model and database
The GTAP database has been used in all of these studies within CGE modelling
frameworks.  However, the models differ from study to study.  It was decided to use the
standard GTAP model and the database (version 6) in the present study.  In this section
the main features of the GTAP model and the database are briefly outlined.
1
1.  Overview of the GTAP model
As noted in the introduction, the GTAP model and the database have been widely
used to explore the economic effects of global and regional trade liberalization around the
world in recent years.  Since the establishment of GTAP in 1992, many analysts have used
either the standard GTAP model or the GTAP database to quantify the economic effects of
RTAs around the world.  In fact, this has been one of the most researched areas using
GTAP.  The structure of the “standard” GTAP model is well documented in chapter 2 of
Hertel (1997).  Although there are new extensions of this core model, only the standard
GTAP model is used in this study together with the GTAP database.  The core of GTAP is
1 See the GTAP website at http://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu for more details.140
its database that comprises a fully articulate record of transactions as well as export and
import duties between different regions for a wide range of commodities.  Since 1992,
a number of versions of the GTAP database have been released.  With each updated
version, the quality of data has increased.  The number of regions and commodities has
also increased.  Since the early versions, countries in the Asia-Pacific region have been
well represented in GTAP.  This present analysis uses the GTAP version 6 database as it
represents a more disaggregated Asia-Pacific regional classification as well as improved
quality of protection data.
There are some advantages of using the GTAP model to analyse the effects of
agricultural  trade  liberalization  on  Asia  and  the  Pacific.    First,  the  GTAP  model  links
different  individual  countries  and  regions  with  detailed  specifications  that  describe  the
economic activities of firms, households and governments.  Second, the model is based
on the input-output structures of each region or country that link industries together in
a value-added chain, starting from primary goods and moving into continuously higher
stages  of  intermediate  processing,  to  the  final  assembling  of  consumption  goods  for
households and governments.  Third, all individual regions or countries are linked through
international trade flows to form a single global general equilibrium model in which prices
and quantities supplied and demanded are determined simultaneously in all primary factor
markets in domestic and international commodity markets.  Finally, the GTAP model structure
reflects the fact that all parts of the economy are connected in a network of direct and
indirect  linkages.    This  means  that  any  changes  in  any  part  of  the  system  will  have
repercussions throughout the global economy.
The standard GTAP model is a comparative static global general equilibrium model
based  on  neo-classical  economic  theory.    Neo-classical  utility  maximization  and  cost
minimization assumptions are used to derive demand functions for household consumption
and  inputs.    Each  region  contains  a  representative  household  that  maximizes  regional
utility.   The  private  household  demand  is  specified  as  a  Constant  Difference  Elasticity
(CDE) demand system.  In all markets (both output and factor markets), perfect competition
is assumed while the constant returns scale technology is assumed in production.  Firms
are all assumed to maximize profits.  Market clearing conditions are enforced for all the
markets.    The  production  of  each  commodity  employs  a  composite  of  primary  factors
called value-added (a Constant Elasticity of Substitution [CES] of various primary factors)
and an intermediate input composite (a CES composite of domestically produced goods
and  imported  goods).    The  value-added  component  is  combined  with  the  composite
intermediate input in a Leontief fashion to form the final product.  Technical changes are
incorporated into the value-added nest and the final output nest.  Further, the production
system  has  been  incorporated  into  the  GTAP  model  in  order  to  distinguish  production
sectors by their intensities in factors of production.  Five factors of production have been
identified:  (a) agricultural land; (b) other natural resources; (c) unskilled labour; (d) skilled
labour; and (e) physical capital.
International trade is modelled as a nested Armington structure (Armington, 1969),
which not only differentiates imported goods from domestically produced ones but also141
differentiates imported products by regions.  This structure is useful in tracking the existing
trade pattern, especially the “cross hauling” of similar products.  In the first net of this
structure, imports of a given good are sourced by origins and then combined by a CES
function  as  a  composite  at  the  border  of  the  importing  country.    Once  the  composite
product is imported into the region, it is considered a homogeneous product and cannot be
distinguished by origin.  This composite imported good is further divided into intermediate
input, private consumption and government consumption.  However, composite imported
goods are differentiated from domestically produced goods when consumers/producers
are making a decision on the optimal mix of domestic and imported goods.
In order to carry out policy simulations with the model, it is necessary to close it by
declaring some variables as exogenous since there are more variables than equations in
the model.  This is known as the “closure” of the model in CGE modelling literature.  In the
standard closure, regional savings are assumed to be homogeneous and contribute to
a pool of savings, which is then allocated among regions for investment in response to
change in regional expected rates of return.  These changes are assumed to be equalized
across regions, thus giving rise to capital mobility across regions.  These assumptions
allow greater changes in the balance of trade balance as a result of trade liberalization,
and  tend  to  dampen  the  terms  of  trade  effects.    Both  labour  and  capital  stocks  are
assumed to be mobile within a region and immobile across regions.  However, land and
natural resources are industry-specific.  All factors of production are assumed constant
and, hence, factor prices adjust to clear factor markets.
2.  Main features of GTAP database, version 6
The standard GTAP model based on the GTAP version 6 database has been used
to perform various simulations for this study.  The GTAP version 6 database covers up to
a maximum of 87 regions and countries, 57 industries and 5 primary factor endowments.
It gives a “snapshot” of the world economy in 2001.  The GTAP database distinguishes
trade transactions between commodities and services based on their regions of origin and
destination as well as agents such as intermediate users, households and governments
that absorb the commodities in the importing country.  Trade taxes have been recorded for
every trade transaction.  The database consists of regional input-output tables that take
detailed  account  of  the  inter-industrial  linkages  within  regions,  detailed  bilateral  trade,
transport  and  protection  data  that  describe  the  interregional  economic  linkages  and
macroeconomic data.  All these data sources are combined in a consistent manner.  Often
in a research application, the sectors and regions are aggregated to a smaller size that
suits specific needs of the research.  Although the scope of GTAP has far exceeded the
boundary of “trade analysis”, bilateral trade data and the protection instruments remain
two key components in its database, the quality of which has improved continuously.  The
quality  of  the  data  and  the  solid  structure  of  the  model  provide  insurance  of  quality
analysis on trade liberalization, as the correct representation of the initial trade structure
and the protection situation determine whether the starting point is accurate.142
According to Martin and Anderson (2005), the new version of the GTAP database
(version 6) contains a number of additional features compared with the previous versions:
• New protection data are included for a recent year (2001) compared with the
previous version (1997);
• Using  systematically  developed  new  protection  data  from  the  MAcMap
database,  this  version  has  incorporated  much  detail  on  different  items  of
protection such as bound and applied tariffs, non-reciprocal as well as reciprocal
tariff preferences, and the ad valorem equivalents of specific tariffs for the
first time;
• Also  included  are  main  trade  policy  reforms  occurring  outside  the  Doha
negotiations such as the commitments associated with accession to WTO by
such economies as China and Taiwan Province of China;
• The implementation of the last Uruguay Round commitments such as the
abolition of quotas on trade in textiles and clothing at the end of 2004 and
final agricultural tariff reductions in developing countries; and
• The incorporation of the European Union expansion from 15 to 25 members
in April 2004.  This new database contains all new member countries, so an
EU 25 region can be aggregated.
In  order  to  undertake  any  sensible  policy  simulation  with  the  GTAP  version  6
database,  it  is  necessary  to  aggregate  regions  or  countries  (with  maximum  possible
disaggregation of the Asia-Pacific region) and sectors (with maximum disaggregation of
agricultural sectors) since it is difficult to use the full disaggregated version of the database
(with 87 countries and regions, and 57 industries) in this study.  As table 2 shows, the
aggregated database of this study contains 24 regions, with many Asia-Pacific countries
featured separately, and 26 sectors, keeping all agricultural sectors separately.
D.  Effects of agricultural trade liberalization
in Asia-Pacific RTAs and BTAs
This section provides estimates of potential welfare gains as a result of agricultural
trade liberalization under different RTA and BTA initiatives.  The main intention is not to
attempt to quantify the effects of all RTAs and BTAs similar to Scollay and Gilbert (2001),
due to time and resource constraints; instead, an attempt is made to evaluate the effects
of agricultural liberalization related to selected RTAs and BTAs.
1.  Experiments
The impact of RTAs within the Asia-Pacific region and the hypothetical gigantic
Asia-Pacific RTA would be analysed through the use of the GTAP model by simulating
possible  agricultural  trade  liberalization  (elimination  of  all  import  tariffs  within  member
countries).  Many CGE studies related to the Asia-Pacific region, including those surveyed
in section B of this chapter, did not focus on:143
(a) The effects of agricultural trade liberalization within RTAs;
(b) The link between multilateral agricultural trade liberalization under DDA and
possible agricultural trade liberalization within RTAs.
Therefore, it was decided to focus on the above two aspects in this study.  First, it
was decided to run all simulations to focus on agricultural trade liberalization within RTAs.
As reviewed in chapters II and III, many of the current and proposed RTAs and BTAs
exclude a wide range of agricultural products.  This study attempts to evaluate the effects
Table 2.  Aggregation of GTAP regions and industries
Number Code DescriptionNumber Code Description
1 AUS Australia 1 PDR Paddy rice
2 NZL New Zealand 2 WHT Wheat
3 XOC Rest of Oceania 3 GRO Cereal grains nec
4 CHN China 4 V_F Vegetables, fruit, nuts
5 HKG Hong Kong, China 5 OSDs Oil seeds
6 JPN Japan 6 C_B Sugar cane, sugar beet
7 KOR Republic of Korea 7 PFB Plant-based fibres
8 TWN Taiwan Province of China 8 OCR Crops nec
9 XEA Rest of East Asia 9 CTL Bovine cattle, sheep
and goats, horses
10 IDN Indonesia 10 OAP Animal products nec
11 MYS Malaysia 11 RMK Raw milk
12 PHL Philippines 12 WOL Wool, silkworm cocoons
13 SGP Singapore 13 FRS Forestry
14 THA Thailand 14 FSH Fishing
15 VNM Viet Nam 15 OIL Oil, coal, gas and
minerals nec
16 XSE Rest of South-East Asia 16 CMT Bovine meat products
17 BGD Bangladesh 17 OMT Meat products nec
18 IND India 18 VOL Vegetable oils and fats
19 LKA Sri Lanka 19 MIL Dairy products
20 XSA Rest of South Asia 20 PCR Processed rice
21 USA United States 21 SGR Sugar
22 CNA Canada 22 OFD Food products nec
23 EU EU 25 23 B_T Beverages and tobacco
products
24 ROW Rest of the World 24 TEX Textiles and wearing
apparel
25 MNFCS Other manufacturing
26 SVCES All services
Note: nec = Not elsewhere classified.144
of agricultural trade liberalization if the members of RTAs and BTAs are also willing to
extend preferences towards agricultural trade.  Second, an attempt is made to establish
the link between multilateral trade liberalization and agricultural trade liberalization within
RTAs.
Although there are a number of approaches to establishing this link, the approach
used in this chapter is the introduction of RTAs and BTAs as post-DDA scenarios.  As the
starting point, a basic simulation is run to capture the DDA trade liberalization reform.
Similar to previous studies reviewed in section A, the proposed tariff cuts and elimination
of subsidies for DDA trade liberalization are used in this simulation to create an updated
database using the GTAP model and the adjusted database described in the previous
section.    This  updated  database  takes  into  account  the  effects  of  multilateral  trade
liberalization.  After creating this updated database, simulations related selected RTAs and
BTAs were carried out to evaluate how countries’ gains or losses from multilateral trade
liberalization would alter with the agricultural trade reforms within RTAs and BTAs if the
member countries agreed to extend preferences to cover agricultural products.  A number
of simulations were carried out using the selected scenarios listed below in relation to
selected RTAs and BTAs in the region.
(a) Selected experiments related to RTAs
Experiment 1 – SAFTA:  SAARC countries eliminating agricultural tariffs with one
another while maintaining existing agricultural barriers on trade with other countries.
Experiment 2 – AFTA:  ASEAN countries eliminating agricultural tariffs with one
another while maintaining existing agricultural barriers on trade with other countries.
Experiment 3 – ASEAN plus 3:  ASEAN plus 3 countries eliminating agricultural
tariffs with one another while maintaining existing agricultural barriers on trade with other
countries.
Experiment  4  – ASEAN  plus  3  plus  India:   ASEAN  plus  3  countries  and  India
eliminating  agricultural  tariffs  with  one  another  while  maintaining  existing  agricultural
barriers on trade with other countries.
Experiment 5 – Gigantic Asia-Pacific RTA:  ESCAP member countries (excluding
North American  and  South American  countries)  eliminating  agricultural  tariffs  with  one
another while maintaining existing agricultural barriers on trade with other countries.
(b) Selected experiments related to BTAs
Experiment  6  –  Indo-Lanka  Trade Agreement:    India  and  Sri  Lanka  eliminating
agricultural tariffs with one another while maintaining existing agricultural barriers on trade
with other countries.145
Experiment 7 – Thailand-Japan Trade Agreement:  Thailand and Japan eliminating
agricultural tariffs with one another while maintaining existing agricultural barriers on trade
with other countries.
It is important to note here that all the experiments mentioned above focused on
the removal of all agricultural tariffs within RTAs and BTAs.  This is not exactly what is
happening  in  actual  trade  negotiations  related  to  these  agreements.    As  reviewed  in
chapters II and III, there are “sensitive” agricultural sectors such as sugar, tea and rice.
Many member countries are reluctant to include these sectors in trade agreements.  However,
the incorporation of actual tariff cuts in these agreements and the exclusion of sensitive
products  was  a  very  difficult  and  complex  task  in  this  study.    For  example,  the  GTAP
commodity  classification  was  not  sufficient  to  accommodate  some  of  the  “sensitive”
agricultural sectors in this region.  Therefore, an attempt was made to evaluate the effects
of full removal of agricultural tariffs within RTAs and BTAs to produce some benchmarks.
(c) Results of the experiments
In this section, the results of the different simulations related to the above experiments
are discussed.  Only the welfare results have been used to indicate “winners” and “losers”.
Analysing the welfare effects of trade liberalization under different scenarios is a complex
task.  Similar to any other GTAP application, the measure of change in welfare reported in
this chapter is the equivalent variation in income, which can be defined as the money
matrix equivalent of the utility change bought about by the price change.  The standard
GTAP model provides the results with a number of welfare decomposition components, in
order to trace major factors that course welfare changes.  There are two main factors or
components  among  these  components.    The  first  important  welfare  component  is  the
allocation efficiency.  Countries are achieving efficiency gains when they remove trade
distortion.    This  is  the  well-known  allocation  efficiency.    The  second  important  welfare
component is the terms of trade (TOT) effect.  In general, trade liberalization in agriculture
will  lead  to  a  rise  in  food  prices,  particularly  in  the  case  of  products  that  are  highly
protected in developed countries.  This will lead to a TOT improvement in countries that
are net exporters of protected commodities.  On the other hand, net food importing countries
expect to lose through TOT deterioration.  This study focuses on these two factors when
presenting results in this section.
It  is  important  to  caution  readers  about  the  welfare  results  of  this  study  before
carrying  out  the  simulations  and  analysing  the  results.    As  summarised  in  section  B,
Baldwin and Venables (1995) grouped the possible mechanisms for welfare changes as
a result of forming an RTA under three groups.  In common with many CGE studies, the
simulations  carried  out  with  the  standard  GTAP  model  in  this  study  only  identify  the
welfare mechanisms in the first group.  Therefore, it is obvious that the results underestimate
the welfare gains or loss.  To capture other mechanisms, a dynamic CGE model based on
imperfect competition is necessary.  However, this study only uses the standard static
GTAP model, based on the perfect competition assumption since dynamic and imperfect
competitive variants of global CGE models are not freely available to users.146
(i) Agricultural trade liberalization under SAFTA
Some of the main findings of the review of South Asian regional integration and
agricultural trade liberalization in chapter II are that:
• South Asian economies remain the most protective region for agriculture;
• The South Asia interregional trade negotiations have given fewer preferences
for agricultural trade;
• The number of agricultural products covered in these negotiations is very
limited;
• The RTR and REST indices indicate potential for improving agricultural trade
in the region;
• India  can  provide  more  opportunities  to  promote  agricultural  trade  in  the
region.
The above findings indicate that agricultural trade liberalization is limited under the
current preferential trading arrangements in South Asia.  This allows a simulation to be run
to examine the effects of full agricultural trade liberalization within the region if the member
countries are willing to extend preferences toward agriculture with the implementation of
multilateral trade liberalization under DDA.  This will help in answering the question of “is it
worthwhile for South Asian countries to move towards an FTA rather than focusing on
multilateral  trade  liberalization?”    This  question  has  been  raised  by  several  experts  in
recent years in relation to SAFTA (Panagariya, 1999 and 2003).  As stated at the beginning
of this chapter, this simulation was run using the updated database after running the DDA
simulation.   The  welfare  results  of  this  experiment  are  presented  in  table  3.   The  last
column  of  table  3  shows  the  effects  of  multilateral  trade  liberalization  for  comparison
purposes.
As table 3 shows, while major South Asian countries (India and the rest of South
Asia  including  Pakistan)  would  benefit  moderately  from  agricultural  trade  liberalization
among the South Asian countries under SAFTA, small countries such as Bangladesh and
Sri Lanka might experience moderate welfare losses.  This is not surprising considering
the relative share of South Asian trade in total world trade, as welfare results depend to
a large extend on trade shares.  As expected, India and Pakistan are winners.  The results
of revealed comparative advantage (RCA) calculations in chapter II indicated that India
has RCA in a wide variety of agricultural goods and a higher potential to benefit from
agricultural trade liberalization within the region.  The results of our simulation support this
finding.  Bangladesh and Sri Lanka are likely to lose because they are net food importers.
Bangladesh would be the biggest loser of welfare as a result of TOT effects.  The low
complementarity  of  trade  within  the  region  and  low  intraregional  trade  as  indicated  in
chapter II have been reasons for marginal gains from agricultural trade liberalization in the
region.  South Asian countries, particularly India, would gain more under multilateral trade
liberalization.  These results are consistent with the previous study by Bandara and Yu
(2003).    The  results  show  that  the  potential  gains  from  agricultural  trade  liberalization147
Table 3.  Welfare effects of trade liberalization under SAFTA
(Equivalent variation in income, in 2001 US$ million)
Total
Total













1. Australia 0.2 -9.8 -9.6 452.30
2. New Zealand -0.1 -1.2 -1.2 385.58
3. Rest of Oceania 0.0 0.0 0.0 69.93
4. China 4.9 2.9 6.8 -49.21
5. Hong Kong, China 0.0 1.7 2.0 -21.6
6. Japan 0.2 4.5 4.6 4 809.76
7. Republic of Korea -1.8 1.8 -0.3 1 581.01
8. Taiwan Province of China -0.1 1.7 1.5 9.78
9. Rest of East Asia 0.1 0.2 0.3 37.98
10. Indonesia 0.7 -12.0 -8.5 -10.68
11. Malaysia -0.4 -4.0 -4.0 273.16
12. Philippines 0.3 0.0 0.2 -2.13
13. Singapore 0.1 0.2 0.3 10.22
14. Thailand 0.3 -4.1 -3.6 240.54
15. Viet Nam 0.3 -0.9 -0.7 3.12
16. Rest of South-East Asia 0.1 -2.6 -2.3 15.71
17. Bangladesh 3.2 -9.1 -8.2 -7.08
18. India 3.8 9.5 12.9 466.29
19. Sri Lanka -3.9 3.1 -0.8 16.09
20. Rest of South Asia -4.3 61.8 58.9 27.35
21. United States -3.3 -10 -15.3 773.5
22. Canada -0.4 -7.2 -7.1 429.22
23. European Union 7.7 -2.2 5.5 6 685.68
24. Rest of the world 2.5 -24.4 -21.3 357.90
Total 10.2 -0.2 10.1 16 554.46
Note: The sum of allocation efficiency and terms of trade does not equal the “total column” as
total  welfare  also  includes  other  components.    See  Huff  and  Hertel  (1996)  for  welfare
decomposition in the GTAP model.148
would be moderate under SAFTA and it is therefore important for South Asian countries to
pursue multilateral trade liberalization.  This was emphasised by Panagariya (1999 and
2003) on a number of occasions using a simple analytical model.
(ii) Agricultural trade liberalization under AFTA
Once again, before analysing the quantitative results of this experiment, it is also
important to note some findings of the descriptive analysis of agricultural trade between
ASEAN countries in chapter III:
• The average share of intra-ASEAN agricultural exports (imports) in total ASEAN
exports (imports) between 1993 and 2003 was low at 1.6 (1.4) per cent, while
that of extra-ASEAN was slightly higher at 6 (5) per cent;
• In general, there is product similarity in agricultural trade or trade competitiveness
rather than trade complementarity;
• The tariffs on a large proportion of intra-ASEAN agricultural trade are much
lower compared to the most favoured nation (MFN) tariffs on extra-ASEAN
agricultural trade.
Table 4 shows the potential welfare gains of agricultural under AFTA.  The gains
from agricultural trade liberalization are not large.  These results are not surprising and, in
fact, are consistent with the findings in chapter III.  Even individual country welfare results
related  to ASEAN  members  are  consistent  with  the  descriptive  analysis  in  chapter  III.
Agricultural trade liberalization within the ASEAN region results in welfare gains for member
countries except the Philippines.  However, the gains are not large.  Members such as
Thailand and Viet Nam perform well.  As shown in chapter III, both Thailand and Viet Nam
have  a  comparative  advantage  in  a  wide  variety  of  agricultural  products.    The  results
suggest that the Philippines could suffer a very small loss as a result of agricultural trade
liberalization within ASEAN.  The welfare loss as a result of TOT deterioration is much
bigger for the Philippines than for other countries.  Agricultural trade liberalization within
ASEAN member countries could result in welfare loses in non-partner countries, including
small Asia-Pacific and South Asian countries, because of the well-known trade diversion
effect.
(iii) Trade liberalization under ASEAN plus three countries
The results of the previous experiment demonstrate that agricultural trade liberalization
within the ASEAN region would not result in substantial welfare gains for member countries.
In this experiment, an attempt is made to show how ASEAN countries would benefit from
an RTA of ASEAN plus three big economies in the region (China, the Republic of Korea
and Japan).  As noted in chapter III:
(a) Inter-ASEAN agricultural trade is higher than intra-ASEAN agricultural trade;149
(b) Agricultural trade between ASEAN member countries, Japan and the Republic
of Korea is more complementary than competitive, and there is a large degree
of trade complementarity;
(c) Protection of the agricultural sector in Japan and the Republic of Korea is
higher than in ASEAN member countries.
This experiment simulated the effects of agricultural trade liberalization within an
enlarged AFTA covering ASEAN member countries plus China, the Republic of Korea and
Japan.  This simulation was run on the updated database after running the AFTA simulation
Table 4.  Welfare effects of agricultural trade liberalization under AFTA
(Equivalent variation in income, in 2001 US$ million)
Welfare
Allocative Terms of trade Total welfare
efficiency effects changes
1. Australia 0.6 -2.0 -0.7
2. New Zealand -0.4 -7.7 -7.4
3. Rest of Oceania -1.3 -4.2 -6.5
4. China -9.4 -33.2 -31.8
5. Hong Kong, China -0.1 -11.7 -12.2
6. Japan -20.9 -10.6 -23.1
7. Republic of Korea -5.6 -6.9 -10.7
8. Taiwan Province of China -0.3 -5.5 -4.8
9. Rest of East Asia -1.4 -1.3 -3.5
10. Indonesia 17.3 6.1 19.2
11. Malaysia 64.7 -7.4 20.8
12. Philippines 51.2 -50.5 -6.4
13. Singapore 8.8 87.0 101.1
14. Thailand -14.7 109.3 90.7
15. Viet Nam 0.7 26.0 20.6
16. Rest of South-East Asia -3.6 -9.7 -9.1
17. Bangladesh -0.1 -1.3 -1.6
18. India -0.6 -6.7 -6.2
19. Sri Lanka -0.2 -0.1 -0.3
20. Rest of South Asia -0.7 -1.5 -2.1
21. United States 9.7 -20.4 -8.4
22. Canada 2.0 2.5 6.4
23. European Union 2.1 -14.6 0.1
24. Rest of the world -10.2 -35.6 -36.8
Total 87.5 -0.1 87.4
Note: The sum of allocation efficiency and terms of trade does not equal the “total column” as
total  welfare  also  includes  other  components.    See  Huff  and  Hertel  (1996)  for  welfare
decomposition in the GTAP model.150
to examine the marginal benefits of adding the big three economies to ASEAN.  Table 5
shows the welfare effects that emerged from this simulation.  In this case, all participating
countries in the RTA would benefit and the welfare gains would be much higher than those
of AFTA.  Japan would be the biggest winner from agricultural trade liberalization in an
ASEAN plus 3 RTA (more than US$ 13 billion).  The Republic of Korea would be the
second  biggest  winner  from  this  RTA.    In  fact,  these  countries  would  gain  more  than
multilateral trade liberalization since full liberalization of agricultural trade within ASEAN
plus 3 is assumed, rather than the reduction of tariffs by certain percentages under multilateral
trade liberalization.
Table 5.  Welfare effects of trade liberalization under ASEAN plus 3
(Equivalent variation in income, in 2001 US$ million)
Welfare
Allocative Terms of trade Total welfare
efficiency effects changes
1. Australia 8.0 -166.6 -155
2. New Zealand -1.7 -47.4 -44.1
3. Rest of Oceania -3.3 -6.7 -12.2
4. China -1 049.6 2 721.3 1 382.0
5. Hong Kong, China -0.2 -139.5 -133.8
6. Japan 13 768.5 -601.9 1 3418.2
7. Republic of Korea 6 186.2 -3 328.2 2824.1
8. Taiwan Province of China 2.7 77.6 80.6
9. Rest of East Asia 5.9 107.2 138.7
10. Indonesia 17.1 23.0 15.7
11. Malaysia 0.0 68.4 25.0
12. Philippines 11.1 -86.2 -86.1
13. Singapore 65.9 603.9 704.6
14. Thailand -169.6 785.4 578.2
15. Viet Nam -111.3 84.0 -17.9
16. Rest of South-East Asia -205.9 -4.7 -203.8
17. Bangladesh -6.2 -2.6 -6.5
18. India 17.8 -24.0 -2.9
19. Sri Lanka 0.2 -2.5 -2.2
20. Rest of South Asia 7.9 -1.5 7.0
21. United States 160.4 -311.4 -112.8
22. Canada 9.1 -39.7 -24.7
23. European Union 95.4 424.8 554.4
24. Rest of the world -19.0 -169.6 -172.4
Total 18 789.8 -37.0 18 754.2
Note: The sum of allocation efficiency and terms of trade does not equal the “total column” as
total  welfare  also  includes  other  components.    See  Huff  and  Hertel  (1996)  for  welfare
decomposition in the GTAP model.151
These  results  once  again  confirm  one  of  the  main  conclusions  of  the  previous
comprehensive  CGE  study  by  Scollay  and  Gilbert  (2001)  on  RTAs  and  BTAs  in  the
Asia-Pacific region.  According to them, the welfare gains from RTAs would be much larger
in the case of RTAs and BTAs involving developed countries such as Japan.  However, our
results demonstrate that while developed and large developing countries would gain from
an ASEAN plus 3, small countries such as the Philippines and Viet Nam would be at risk of
moderate welfare losses.  This could be due to competition from a country such as China.
For example, Viet Nam was found to be a main winner under the AFTA scenario.  However,
the results of this simulation show that Viet Nam could experience a welfare loss from an
ASEAN plus 3.  This might be due to competition from China in agricultural trade.
Excluded countries, such as those in South Asia, are likely to suffer under this
scenario due to possible trade diversion effects.
(iv) Trade liberalization under ASEAN plus 3 plus India
In this experiment India was added to the ASEAN plus 3 RTA.  Once again, the
updated database was used to eliminate tariffs between ASEAN plus 3 plus India in order
to evaluate the marginal effect of adding India to ASEAN plus 3.  Table 6 presents the
welfare gains under this scenario.  Again, all participating countries would gain under this
RTA.  The results suggest that India would gain much more in participating in an ASEAN
plus 3 plus India RTA than in a South Asian RTA.  Our results are consistent with recent
efforts by India in joining an ASEAN RTA.  The marginal benefits of adding India to ASEAN
plus 3 would not be as large as adding Japan, the Republic of Korea and China to ASEAN.
However, all member countries would benefit from adding India to ASEAN plus 3.
(v) Trade liberalization under a gigantic Asia-Pacific RTA
Under this scenario it is assumed that all countries in the Asia-Pacific region, with
the exception of the United States, are participating in a gigantic Asia-Pacific RTA similar
to the European Union and NAFTA.  The database, updated after running the DDA agricultural
scenario, was also used in this experiment.  The welfare results, shown in table 7, are very
interesting.  Overall, many countries in the region could gain more from the gigantic RTA
than by participating in small RTAs.  The total gains are higher than even the total welfare
gains  from  the  DDA  agricultural  scenario  because  full  liberalization  of  agriculture  was
assumed in this experiment.  However, the results suggest that two small South Asian
countries (Bangladesh and Sri Lanka) and the Philippines could suffer welfare losses as
a  result  of  agricultural  trade  liberalization  under  a  gigantic  Asia-Pacific  RTA.    This  is
because of the competition from other developing countries in the regions.
The Indo-Lanka FTA has been one of the most popular BTAs in the South Asian
region  and  an  example  for  small  BTAs.   The  results  of  agricultural  trade  liberalization
between India and Sri Lanka are shown in table 8.152
Table 6.  Welfare effects of trade liberalization under ASEAN plus 3 plus India
(Equivalent variation in income, in 2001 US$ million)
Welfare
Allocative Terms of trade Total welfare
efficiency effects changes
1. Australia 9.5 -214.5 -199.7
2. New Zealand -2.0 -50.7 -47.1
3. Rest of Oceania -3.3 -6.4 -11.8
4. China -1 010.7 2 635.0 1 353.7
5. Hong Kong, China -0.2 -138.8 -132.2
6. Japan 13 495.6 -644.6 13 121.4
7. Republic of Korea 6 293.5 -3 303.3 2 954.1
8. Taiwan Province of China 3.6 77.5 81.6
9. Rest of East Asia 5.5 107.7 138.7
10. Indonesia -10.0 201.7 111.1
11. Malaysia 125.5 262.4 295.5
12. Philippines 61.5 -33.5 21.0
13. Singapore 62.5 560.1 658.0
14. Thailand -34.3 859.0 783.7
15. Viet Nam 2.4 47.1 56.3
16. Rest of South-East Asia -7.4 59.7 50.7
17. Bangladesh -6.7 -4.6 -8.9
18. India 408.4 -118.4 296
19. Sri Lanka 0.0 -3.7 -3.5
20. Rest of South Asia 7.9 -22.3 -14.1
21. United States 197.5 -423.9 -166.7
22. Canada 13.5 -77.8 -53.3
23. European Union 123.8 440.3 624.3
24. Rest of the world -8.4 -245.3 -216.9
Total 19 727.7 -37.0 19 692.2
Note: The sum of allocation efficiency and terms of trade does not equal the “total column” as
total  welfare  also  includes  other  components.    See  Huff  and  Hertel  (1996)  for  welfare
decomposition in the GTAP model.
(vi) Indo-Lanka Free Trade Agreement
As pointed out in Scollay and Gilbert (2001), our results suggest that forming a BTA
between small developing countries would not result in big welfare gains for the participating
countries.  In fact, some small countries may lose from these BTAs.  Sri Lanka tends to
lose from agricultural trade liberalization under the Indo-Lanka FTA.  This is the reason
why Sri Lanka is reluctant to open its market to agricultural exports from India.  As shown
in chapter II, India has a comparative advantage in a wide variety of agricultural commodities
and has become a major food supplier to Sri Lanka.  Therefore, agricultural trade liberalization
under the Indo-Lanka FTA will lead to further benefits for India.  Other countries in the153
Table 7.  Welfare effects of trade liberalization within the ESCAP region
(Equivalent variation in income, in 2001 US$ million)
Welfare
Allocative Terms of trade Total welfare
efficiency effects changes
1. Australia 28.4 1 642.1 1 666.4
2. New Zealand 20.7 151.4 154.6
3. Rest of Oceania 43.9 44.9 108.6
4. China -928.1 2 235.6 1 089.6
5. Hong Kong, China -1.0 -89.6 -82.1
6. Japan 14 399.8 -1 171.9 13 529.6
7. Republic of Korea 6 334.5 -3 294.3 3 011.2
8. Taiwan Province of China 57.1 -19.3 45.8
9. Rest of East Asia 5.3 125.7 161.3
10. Indonesia -14.9 157.5 72
11. Malaysia 124.8 284.3 313.6
12. Philippines 67.8 -56.5 2.0
13. Singapore 53.8 474.1 558.3
14. Thailand -2.3 572.6 547.8
15. Viet Nam 22.1 36.1 59.0
16. Rest of South-East Asia -6.8 50.9 43.9
17. Bangladesh 17.4 -33.9 -21.0
18. India 563.3 -328.5 242.2
19. Sri Lanka -2.4 -4.3 -6.5
20. Rest of South Asia 52.0 11.5 64.4
21. United States 222.3 -681.2 -535.8
22. Canada -1.3 -127.9 -108.1
23. European Union 75.0 302.4 444.8
24. Rest of the world -27.2 -331.4 -305.6
Total 21 104.2 -49.6 21 055.9
Note: The sum of allocation efficiency and terms of trade does not equal the “total column” as
total  welfare  also  includes  other  components.    See  Huff  and  Hertel  (1996)  for  welfare
decomposition in the GTAP model.
South Asian region may moderately suffer as a result of this agreement due to the trade
diversion effect.
(vii) Agricultural trade liberalization under a Japan-Thailand FTA
In contrast to the Indo-Lanka FTA, the proposed FTA between Japan and Thailand
is a very interesting case.  This is between a developed and a rapidly developing country
in the region.  There is a trade complementarity between Japan and Thailand.  However,
Japan’s  agricultural  sector  is  highly  protected  compared  to  Thailand.   As  reviewed  in
chapter III, Thailand is the biggest exporter of agricultural and fisheries products to Japan154
and nearly half of its current exports to Japan face market access restrictions.  Japan has
already agreed to cut tariffs on more than 500 agricultural products from Thailand.  However,
they have excluded rice and sugar from the preference list.  This experiment was carried
out to show how Thailand would benefit if Japan removed all barriers to Thai agricultural
exports, even after multilateral trade reform under DDA.
Table  9  presents  the  results  of  this  experiment.    The  results  indicate  that  both
countries would gain from agricultural trade liberalization under this FTA, unlike the case
of the Indo-Lanka FTA.  Thailand is the biggest winner in this case because it is assumed
Table 8.  Welfare effects of trade liberalization under the Indo-Lanka
Trade Agreement
(Equivalent variation in income, in 2001 US$ million)
Welfare
Allocative Terms of trade Total welfare
efficiency effects changes
1. Australia 0.0 -1.1 -1.2
2. New Zealand 0.0 -0.2 -0.2
3. Rest of Oceania 0.0 0.0 0.0
4. China 0.3 -0.1 0.2
5. Hong Kong, China 0.0 0.1 0.1
6. Japan 0.3 0.8 1.2
7. Republic of Korea 0.0 0.3 0.3
8. Taiwan Province of China 0.0 0.1 0.1
9. Rest of East Asia 0.0 0.0 0.0
10. Indonesia 0.0 -1.2 -1.0
11. Malaysia -0.1 -0.2 -0.3
12. Philippines 0.0 0.0 0.0
13. Singapore 0.0 -0.2 -0.2
14. Thailand 0.1 -1.4 -1.3
15. Viet Nam 0.0 -0.2 -0.2
16. Rest of South-East Asia 0.0 -0.1 -0.1
17. Bangladesh 0.0 -0.1 -0.2
18. India -2.7 8.3 5.5
19. Sri Lanka -5.0 -0.4 -5.4
20. Rest of South Asia 0.2 -1.2 -1.1
21. United States 0.2 -0.2 -0.1
22. Canada 0.0 -0.1 -0.1
23. European Union 0.3 0.1 0.4
24. Rest of the world -0.6 -2.9 -3.4
Total -6.9 0.0 -6.9
Note: The sum of allocation efficiency and terms of trade does not equal the “total column” as
total  welfare  also  includes  other  components.    See  Huff  and  Hertel  (1996)  for  welfare
decomposition in the GTAP model.155
that  Japan  is  ready  to  remove  its  high  trade  barriers  to  Thai  agricultural  exports.   As
Thailand is a net agricultural exporter to Japan, it would enjoy a huge welfare gain through
TOT.  Japan would also benefit from this FTA, as shown in table 9.  These gains are
through allocation efficiency.  However, the results also show that there is a trade diversion
problem because of discriminatory trade.  Some other countries in the region, such as
Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines and the rest of South-East Asia, might lose due to the
Thai-Japan FTA.
Table 9.  Welfare effects of trade liberalization under Japan-Thailand
Trade Agreement
(Equivalent variation in income, in 2001 US$ million)
Welfare
Allocative Terms of trade Total welfare
efficiency effects changes
1. Australia 5.6 -22.0 -17.3
2. New Zealand 0.9 5.7 7.4
3. Rest of Oceania -1.8 -5.1 -9.2
4. China -25.0 -68.5 -52.5
5. Hong Kong, China 0.6 -67.8 -72.2
6. Japan 5 805.2 -3 440.1 2 545.2
7. Republic of Korea -16.3 -3.5 -6.4
8. Taiwan Province of China -4.1 -2.7 6.3
9. Rest of East Asia 2.7 57.0 70.9
10. Indonesia -17.7 -32.4 -41.9
11. Malaysia -17.1 -75.9 -60.9
12. Philippines -21.1 5.9 -16.0
13. Singapore -5.0 -55.9 -66.1
14. Thailand -109.2 3 672.5 3 477.4
15. Viet Nam 1.0 35.2 40.2
16. Rest of South-East Asia -4.7 -17.4 -22.7
17. Bangladesh -2.2 -3.0 -5.8
18. India -25.9 50.5 22.1
19. Sri Lanka 0.0 1.3 1.2
20. Rest of South Asia -6.1 22.4 16.4
21. United States 9.7 236 58.7
22. Canada 0.9 -27.0 -18.0
23. European Union -172.7 -24.3 -219.1
24. Rest of the world -251.8 -283.8 -534.0
Total 5 145.7 -43 5 103.6
Note: The sum of allocation efficiency and terms of trade does not equal the “total column” as
total  welfare  also  includes  other  components.    See  Huff  and  Hertel  (1996)  for  welfare
decomposition in the GTAP model.156
E.  Limitations of the above quantitative analysis
The main tool used in the quantitative analysis in this chapter was the standard
GTAP model based on the version 6 database, which has become the most popular global
CGE model in the world.  As noted in section B, the CGE modelling technique has also
become the most popular analytical technique for evaluating the effects of RTAs.  However,
these models have been criticized on various grounds such as problems in interpreting the
results,  questions  regarding  the  general  equilibrium  theory  itself,  poor  performance  of
these models, the assumptions used in these models and weak econometric foundations
(Dhar, 2006; Kehoe, 2002; Panagariya, 2000; Panagariya and Duttagupta, 2001; Ackerman,
1999; McKitrick, 1998; and Jorgenson, 1984).  This section briefly outlines some of the
limitations highlighted in the literature in order to show that the results presented in the
previous section are subject to limitations.
First, Dhar (2006) noted the limitations of the theoretical framework of the general
equilibrium model, citing Ackerman (1999).  According to these critics, CGE models are
based on the assumptions of neo-classical microeconomics.  They question the idealistic
behaviour of producers and consumers of equilibrium models as well as the existence of
equilibrium.  In addition, they criticize some assumptions such as perfect competition and
market clearing prices.
Second, CGE models have been criticized on the basis of their sizes using standard
labelling of “black boxes”.  This is the same old argument used by opponents of CGE
modelling, who claim it is difficult to understand what is driving the results because these
models are large and complex.  The critics add that the modellers are unable to interpret
the results due to the complexities of these big models.  In recent years, CGE modellers
have been able to respond to this criticism by making their models more transparent and
by developing methods to explain where the results come from.  Welfare decomposition is
a good example.
Third, the critics (Panagariya 2000; Panagariya and Duttagupta, 2001) argue that
the CGE models generate benefits for a country from its own preferential trade liberalization
due to erroneous reasons, such as:
(a) CGE models are based on internally inconsistent assumptions (wrong models);
(b) The  gains  are  generated  by  choosing  questionable  values  of  some  key
parameters (wrong parameters).
With regard to the first point, critics argue that the CGE models covered by the
survey of Robinson and Thierfelder (2002) are fundamentally flawed because they combine
the Armington assumption (i.e., goods are differentiated by the country of origin) and fixed
terms of trade.  Further, they argue that the product differentiation associated with the
Armington assumption is incompatible with fixed terms of trade.  Using the partial equilibrium
analysis, they argue that the introduction of terms of trade changes (flexibility) leads to
a deterioration of welfare in member countries.  On the second point, they believe that157
CGE models generate benefits from RTAs because modellers are using the wrong model
with the wrong parameter values.  According to them, if a theoretically correct conventional
model is selected, the CGE models are unlikely to generate benefits for a PTA member
from its own preferential trade liberalization.
In their study, Panagariya and Duttagupta (2001) developed a partial equilibrium
model  and  a  stylized  CGE  model.    Then,  they  argued,  the  results  obtained  from  the
stylized model based on the Armington assumption and their “correct” closure were consistent
with their partial equilibrium story, i.e., a member of a PTA hurts itself and benefits the
recipient of the preference.
Finally, the base year of databases and the level of aggregation of the sectors of
CGE models have also been subjected to criticism.
The CGE modellers should take these limitations seriously and attempt to respond
to their critics in a convincing way.  In fact, they have already responded to these criticisms
and attempted to improve the modelling techniques and the quality of results (Bandara
and Yu, 2002; Hertel and others, 2003).
Although CGE models have been subjected to various criticisms such as those
discussed above, they are the most popular analytical technique available to policy analysts
of RTAs because of their ability to capture region-wide and country-wide effects.  They
have also allowed policy analysts to conduct a range of policy simulations, such as this
study, within a consistent and rigorously specified theoretical framework.  To date, the
critics  have  not  been  able  to  produce  an  alternative  empirical  analytical  technique  to
evaluate RTAs.  This has been the main reason for the emergence of hundreds of CGE
applications in analysing RTAs in recent years.
F.  Conclusions
In  this  chapter,  we  have  discussed  the  results  of  the  simulations  related  to
agricultural trade liberalization within selected RTAs and BTAs.  The modelling was carried
out using the standard GTAP model, which is a static model based on the assumption of
perfect competition and its version 6 database.  The starting point was the agricultural
trade liberalization under DDA.  The standard GTAP model was used to create an updated
database with the DDA agricultural reform.  The DDA agricultural reform simulation was
carried out in a similar manner to those in previous studies.  The different policy simulations
were  carried  out  based  on  the  updated  database  except  for  the  ASEAN  plus  3  and
ASEAN plus 3 plus India experiments.  (The updated database from the ASEAN experiment
was used for the ASEAN plus 3 and the updated database from ASEAN plus 3 was used
for the ASEAN plus 3 plus India experiment, in order to observe the marginal benefits of
adding members to an existing PTA).  The main findings of this chapter can be summarized
as follows.158
The  simulation  results  given  in  this  chapter  show  that  the  welfare  effects  of
agricultural trade liberalization on member countries within small RTAs such as SAFTA,
the Indo-Lanka FTA and even AFTA are negligible.  These results, however, suggest that
the  welfare  gains  will  be  larger  when  the  proposed  RTA  is  larger.   At  the  same  time,
however, non-member countries will experience widespread negative welfare effects as
a result of these large RTAs.  In general, countries that are excluded from a particular RTA
are much more likely to suffer welfare losses than are the included countries in the region.
A gigantic RTA for the Asia-Pacific region is more suitable than overlapping small RTAs
and BTAs, as discussed in the recent forums mentioned in the introduction.  Japan may
gain much higher welfare benefits when it participates in an ASEAN RTA and it may suffer
when it does not participate in an ASEAN RTA.  Some South Asian countries may suffer
from a gigantic Asia-Pacific RTA.  One point that stands out from many of our simulations
is  that  Bangladesh  and  the  Philippines  are  at  risk  of  losing  from  agricultural  trade
liberalization in RTAs.  This can be observed in the quantitative studies related to DDA
agricultural trade liberalization surveyed in section A of this chapter.
It should be noted that the simulation results presented in this chapter are subject
to the limitations highlighted otherwise in this publication.159
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